**Context**: Research on how private web3-solutions are used within the Ukrainian-Russian war (with a focus on privacy-protecting currencies like Zcash). It covers both free & occupied Ukrainian territory & Russia. Where even a "like, share or tweet" is enough for prosecution. Meaning that privacy is the way for freedom of speech protection.
[OONI](https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/): "In March 2022, the State Duma and the Federation Council quickly adopted amendments to the Criminal Code. According to the amendments, spreading fake news about military actions, calling for sanctions, and discrediting the Russian armed forces faces will be followed by penalties ranging from a fine of 100,000 rubles to 15 years in prison."
_Roskomnadzor indicated that to cover the Russian military actions in Ukraine only information and data from official Russian sourcesshould be used. Roskomnadzor prohibited naming the “special operation” an attack, an invasion, or a war.._
_In 2022, [Network Freedoms](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RiYPt8dkQAOYW6Yz4cO9LP9oChbVeqSd/view) counted779 cases of criminal charges brought for statements on the network (posts, reposts, statuses on social networks and messengers). This is the annual maximum for 15 years of observations, according to the project’s annual report on Internet freedom in Russia._
**Note**: Ukrainian side covers both free & occupied territory. The latter differs from temporaty occupation (days, weeks, months) to long-lasting periods (6 months+). Occupied territories are known for mass surveillence, public smartphone screening by police & spontaneous house raids with hardware analysis.
[Freedom House](https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2022): "_Starting in April 2022, the Russian military disrupted internet access as it rerouted internet connections in Kherson, an occupied southern city, through Russian networks. This prevented users there from accessing websites that are blocked in Russia, including Ukrainian news sites, Instagram, and Facebook_".
| **Journalist** | **Free territories**: Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. **Occupied territories**: on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local microcommunities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight antrocities. **Moreover**: it covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| **Volunteer** | **Free territories**: humanitarian aid: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. **Occupied territories**: _humanitarian aid_: wants to protect financial sources; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Activist** | **Free territories**: wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities. **Occupied territories**: wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community. **Note**: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveilance | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politician** | **Free territories**: need to have secure communication with partners, team & military; **Occupied territories**: protect communication; protect local human-network; anonimise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Military** | **Free territories**: secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity) **Occupied territories**: protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions - protect personal life | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **LGBTQI+** | **Free territories**: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm **Occupied territories**: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Ethnical minorities** | **Free territories**: abandon from the government support & still under big social pressure (like roma people). **Occupied territories**: are actively prosecuted like Crimean Tatars & are under heavy surveillance | 1. protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars). 2. Protect their donors. 3. Protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Researchers** | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **DAOs** | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Religious minorities** | **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Families of political & military prisoners** | **Occupied territories**: relatives of military representatives in Ukrainian army, volunteers or political activists are the first to be prosecuted by occupied Russian forces (emotionally & physically). Notebooks, phones & socials are regurally screened on anti-Russian propaganda (both at homes, on a streets or online) | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival. 4. Secure sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network in Ukraine & abroad. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Media** | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Donors** | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Teenagers** | **Occupied territories:** teens are exposed to spontaneous leakage of anti-government position (from games like Counter-Strike to chats with pals). [Kherson teens returned to Ukraine](https://twitter.com/grntmedia/status/1638835657219907587) | 1. Protects freedom of speech. 2. Protects closed community. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **General public** | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
**Important context**: “Foreign agent” is a status that marks your relations with foreign institutions (predominantly via finance & political impact). “Foreign agents” is a way to harass both individuals & organisations.
Recent number of laws on “foreign agents”, “on countermeasures in response to discrimination against Russian media abroad”, on the creation of a database of extremist materials, on turnover fines for foreign IT companies who became “hostages”, etc creates a hostile situation for everyone from 70-year elder leaving like under democratic message in socials to people sending money to support, for example, pro-opposition writer.
| **Journalist** | Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| **Volunteer** | Under extreme pressure from law enforcement agents & constant surveillence. | 1. Protect project teams from surveillance & data leakage. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Activist** | Human-rights activists are under constant surveillance. Cases covers broad activism (not just resistance movements): domestic violence AIDS/HIV community or even psychological help. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politician** | Oppositional politicians or even leading party representators that dissagree with pro-war politics are regularly fined or monitored by FSB. Oppositional activities are highly censored in the media (excluding anonymous Telegram channels & owned media managed from abroad). | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Military** | Many russian military members send privately sensitive military data to Ukrainian side. At the same time they share anti-Russian or military condition sentiment to relatives or media. | 1. Protect communication with family members & Ukrainian sources. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| **LGBTQI+** | On 24th of november 2022 Russian parlament passed a law on LGBTQI+ propaganda [ban](https://meduza.io/news/2022/11/24/gosduma-prinyala-zakon-o-polnom-zaprete-propagandy-lgbt). This covers previous & new content from socials to the songs. Community centers, LGBTQI+ rights activists, Telegram groups or pages on socials (including subscribers & followers) are in danger of high fines & law enforcement surveillence. | 1. Protect community from persecution. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect emotional support network. 4. Provide ability for research beyond the firewall (for both educational & emmigration reasons). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Ethnical minorities** | Live under constant surveillance & additional law enforcement pressure. Moreover, their members are among the first to participate in the war (including forcing Crimean Tatars to fight against Ukrainians). | 1. Protect community from surveillance 2. Provide means for survival & culture preservation. 3. Provide tools for access information beyond the government firewall | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Researchers** | Academics are under police pressure. Social media are monitored, cellural data aggregated, lectures recorded. | 1. Provide ability to glimpse over the firewall. 2. Protect communication with foreign institutions & NGOs. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| **Civil society orgs** | Need 100% privacy of both communication & donations. Moreover, there's a high need of team protection from administrative personel to leaders. [Protestniy MGU](https://novaya.media/articles/2022/08/29/protestnyi-mgu-stal-tiuremnym) is an explicit example of the legal prosecution against Telegram micro-media. Important note: many organisations were dependend on government donors & now they are cut from this financial source (experience extreme lack of money). | 1. Protect communication within community. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Religious minorities** | Are actively prosecuted for extremism. [Jehovah’s Witnesses example](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-03/russian-jehovahs-witnesses-asylum-san-diego). Protestants, catolics reguralry have police visits to their churches. | 1. Protect communication with foreign partners. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Families of political prisoners** | Family ties are used be police to harass both imprisoned people & their relatives. They are under surveillance & police pressure. Families are usually excluded from government financial aids. | 1. Provide means for survival. 2. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Media** | Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. [Proekt](https://www.proekt.media), [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media), [Important stories](https://istories.media/en/) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Donors** | Have huge pressure from surveillance apparatus: covering both "sender" & "receiver". "Foreign agent" label could be apply to every side. Moreover, donating to a foreign agent could lead to high fines & further administrative pressure. | 1. Protect identity. | + | - | - | + | - |
| **Teachers** | Teachers are highly censored & surveiled. They are ment to promote propaganda. Western education, especially within diversity & inclusion is highly unwelcome. Even small simpathy for Ukraine could lead to school expulsion. | 1. Get access beyond state firewall. 2. Get anonimous access to anti-censored educational materials. 3. Protect communication with foreign colleagues. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Enterpreneurs** | Collaboration with "non-friendly" countries could lead to external business pressure & it's shutdown. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Freelancers** | Collaboration with the clients & companies from "non-friendly" countries could lead to legislative pressure & fines. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Lawyers** | Human rights legal defenders experience high pressure from personal communication surveillence to law enforcement offline monitoring. Interregional Association of Human Rights Organizations "[Agora](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agora_(organization))" was one of the first to be named a "foreign agent". | 1. Protect personal communication. 2. Protect sensitive data (documents). 3. Protect partners, foreign institutions. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Bloggers** | Opposition or bloggers with big audience are constantly surveiled. Some of them pass through police brutality & were [forced to leave country](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzVyE3UP51I). Lots of them have friends in Ukraine & continue to talk with them via Telegram. Moreover, bloggers receive money from Google, Meta etc that have "foreign agent" status. | 1. Protect their life. 2. Protect personal communication. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **General public** | Reposts, likes, comments are enough for prosecution. Even [small jokes](https://meduza.io/news/2023/03/13/na-zhitelya-ryazanskoy-oblasti-zaveli-ugolovnoe-delo-o-diskreditatsii-armii-iz-za-anekdota-pro-otstuplenie-iz-hersona). Illiterate internet users are making mistakes by exposing themseles to surveillence apparatus. Smartphones are regularly checked on a streets by law enforcement agents: they screen your contacts, browsing history, messengers & gallery. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politicians** | [“FBK”](https://fbk.info) is a key organisation behind opposition candidate Navalny. They key members live in European Union, but thousands of supporters still live in Russia. | Opposition network related to the “FBK” prefers to anonymise their partners in Russia. First of all, because working with the “foreign agent” is a risk of being prosecuted, secondly it could reveal supporters’ identities. “FBK” supporters are perceived by the current Russian government as a key political opponents, so they actively use law enforcement & surveillence actions against them.|
| **Artists** | [“Art doc fest”](https://artdocfest.com/en/) is an international documentary film festival help in Russia. It’s was cancelled in Moscow due to its political position & sharp visual storytelling. | Today festival is held in Riga, but many Russian documentary filmmakers prefer to stay anonymous to protect themselves, film crew & their families. Their visual stories are considered a threat by the Russian government. |
| **Famous people** | Many public figures like C-level executives of the NASDAQ-traded companies, actors, opinion leaders prefers to support NGOs, activists & opposition anonymously. | **Reason**: By using “framing” technique Russia could use their support in social media scandal creation. This could negatively affect “donor” & company public image.|
| **Foreign agent** | Every donation from abroad could be used as to frame recipient as a foreign agent. Even when the case is a donation to animal shelter or [domestic violence’ victim center](https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/02/13/founder-of-russian-anti-domestic-violence-group-to-be-deported-from-georgia). Moreover, "foreign agent" status leads to prosecution of the Nobel Prize 2022 co-recepients [Memorial](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/21/russia-opens-new-case-against-memorial) | Privacy is a #1 priority within the crypto donation track. |
| **Media** | Foreign media actively work with the network of freelancers in Russia from cameramen to journalists. They cover a wide range of tasks from key events documentation to investigative journalism. | Protection is a key priority within the media operations. Because all those freelancers could be prosecuted by the law enforcement agents. |
| **Ethnical minorities** | [Crimean Tatars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Tatar_diaspora) are ethnical minority living in Crimea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. They are active supporters of Ukraine & perceive Crimea as an occupied territory. So Russian government perform surveillance & oppressive actions against them. | Privacy tools could help Crimean Tatars to maintain their ethnical culture, develop fund for a legal support, scale network of their operations & survive under a harsh conditions. |
| **Journalists** | Freedom House. Freedom of the net report: "Following the Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage” from cities and regions under Russian siege. At least eight journalists, including online journalists, were killed by Russian forces during the coverage period... The Institute of Mass Information (IMI), by the end of May 2022, had recorded [280 crimes against journalists](https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/280-crimes-against-journalists-and-the-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-three-months-of-war-i45745) and media in Ukraine committed by Russian forces". | Privacy tools could help journalists cover human rights violation & sustein their lives under constant surveillence |
| **Religious groups** | Priest Serhiy Chudinovich: "_On March 30, 2022, I was captured by representatives of the Russian Federation in Kherson. I spent the whole day in their premises. I was accused of participating in the activities of sabotage and intelligence groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, of being a member of the territorial defense_". Or Oleg Bondarenko's, a church servant of the "Vosor" Adaptation Center at the "Salvation" Pentecostal Church, [story](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzxRAO6rCuE).| [Full report](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf) |
| **Teachers** | Schools, universities are under a constant political pressure & freedom of speech oppression. There are numerous cases of kids contacting law enforcement for teacher' anti-Russian or pro-Ukrainian monologues (max charge: 15 years in prison). [Tamara Edelman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamara_Eidelman) was named a foreign agent & was forced to move out of Russia. [BBC coverage](https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60985018) |
| **Families** | Relatives of everyone from LGBTQI+ people to journalists that fled the country are used to put external pressure on surveilled person. [Chechnia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Chechnya) is famous for using family-ties to force LGBTQI+ people return back & being imprisoned or "convert" into traditional values. | Privacy tools could help LGBTQI+ community create & maintain effective support network from emotional support to financial help with immigration. |
| **Feminists** | Organised activism is banned in Russia. [Feminist Anti-War Resistance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminist_Anti-War_Resistance) organization aims to protest against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. They are champions of counter-propaganda, volunteering & organizing. At the same time they are labeled as a "foreign agent" & actively surveiled. | Privacy tools could help feminists to self-organize & decrease sensitive data leakage. At the same time crypto donations could empower organizational efficiency |
| **Academics** | [Ekaterina Schulmann](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekaterina_Schulmann) is an example of academic & active influencer who was labeled a foreign agent & was forced to leave Russia. | Privacy tools could help academics to protect their communication with foreign institutions, organizations that help flee the country. Moreover, they could protect sensitive documents from leakage. |
