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**Context**: Research on how private web3-solutions are used within the Ukrainian-Russian war (with a focus on privacy-protecting currencies like Zcash). It covers both free & occupied Ukrainian territory & Russia. Where even a "like, share or tweet" is enough for prosecution. Meaning that privacy is the way for freedom of speech protection.
**Important notes**:
**Privacy of the general public is under attack**
**Privacy of the general public is under severe attack - even like could lead to imprisonment**
[OONI](https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/): "In March 2022, the State Duma and the Federation Council quickly adopted amendments to the Criminal Code. According to the amendments, spreading fake news about military actions, calling for sanctions, and discrediting the Russian armed forces faces will be followed by penalties ranging from a fine of 100,000 rubles to 15 years in prison, for example:
@ -45,9 +45,8 @@ _In 2022, [Network Freedoms](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RiYPt8dkQAOYW6Yz4c
| LGBTQI+ | **Free territories**: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm **Occupied territories**: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Ethnical minorities | **Free territories**: abandon from the government support & still under big social pressure (like roma people). **Occupied territories**: are actively prosecuted like Crimean Tatars & are under heavy surveillance | 1. protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars). 2. Protect their donors. 3. Protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Researchers | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Civil society orgs | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| DAOs | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| DAOs | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Families of political & military prisoners | **Occupied territories**: relatives of those families fight in Ukrainian army, volunteer or do political work | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Media | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + |
@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ Recent number of laws on “foreign agents”, “on countermeasures in response
| Researchers | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Civil society orgs | Need 100% privacy of both communication & donations. Moreover, there's a high need of team protection from administrative personel to leaders. [Protestniy MGU](https://novaya.media/articles/2022/08/29/protestnyi-mgu-stal-tiuremnym) is an explicit example of the legal prosecution against Telegram micro-media | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| DAOs | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | ([Jehovah’s Witnesses example](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-03/russian-jehovahs-witnesses-asylum-san-diego) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Families of political prisoners | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Media | Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. [Proekt](https://www.proekt.media), [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media), [Important stories](https://istories.media/en/) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
@ -94,3 +93,4 @@ Recent number of laws on “foreign agents”, “on countermeasures in response
| **Media** | Foreign media actively work with the network of freelancers in Russia from cameramen to journalists. They cover a wide range of tasks from key events documentation to investigative journalism. | Protection is a key priority within the media operations. Because all those freelancers could be prosecuted by the law enforcement agents. |
| **Ethnical minorities** | [Crimean Tatars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Tatar_diaspora) are ethnical minority living in Crimea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. They are active supporters of Ukraine & perceive Crimea as an occupied territory. So Russian government perform surveillance & oppressive actions against them. | Privacy tools could help Crimean Tatars to maintain their ethnical culture, develop fund for a legal support, scale network of their operations & survive under a harsh conditions. |
| **Ukrainian journalists** | Freedom House. Freedom of the net report: "Following the Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage” from cities and regions under Russian siege. At least eight journalists, including online journalists, were killed by Russian forces during the coverage period... The Institute of Mass Information (IMI), by the end of May 2022, had recorded [280 crimes against journalists](https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/280-crimes-against-journalists-and-the-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-three-months-of-war-i45745) and media in Ukraine committed by Russian forces". |
| **Religious groups** | Priest Serhiy Chudinovich: "_On March 30, 2022, I was captured by representatives of the Russian Federation in Kherson. I spent the whole day in their premises. I was accused of participating in the activities of sabotage and intelligence groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, of being a member of the territorial defense_". [Full report](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf) |