Title: Privacy services from Zcash to Status usage within the Ukrainian-Russian war (research)
Status: grant approved by Zcash community grants
Type: Research
Created: 2023-02-01
</pre>
**Context**: Research on how private web3-solutions are used within the Ukrainian-Russian war (with a focus on privacy-protecting currencies like Zcash).
| Journalist | **Free territories**: Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. **Occupied territories**: on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local microcommunities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight antrocities. **Moreover**: it covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| Volunteer | **Free territories**:_ humanitarian aid_: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. **Occupied territories**: _humanitarian aid_: wants to protect financial sources; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Activist | **Free territories**: wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities. **Occupied territories**: wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community. **Note**: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveilance | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Politician | **Free territories**: need to have secure communication with partners, team & military; **Occupied territories**: protect communication; protect local human-network; anonimise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Military | **Free territories**: secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity) **Occupied territories**: protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions - protect personal life | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| LGBTQI+ | **Free territories**: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm **Occupied territories**: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Ethnical minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars); protect their donors; protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Researchers | **Free territories**: look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). **Occupied territories**: look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information; protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. | + | + | + | + | + |
| General public | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks. **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine). | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
**Important context**: “Foreign agent” is a status that marks your relations with foreign institutions (predominantly via finance & political impact). “Foreign agents” is a way to harass both individuals & organisations.
| Media | Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. [Proekt](https://www.proekt.media), [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media), [Important stories](https://istories.media/en/) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politicians** | [“FBK”](https://fbk.info) is a key organisation behind opposition candidate Navalny. They key members live in European Union, but thousands of supporters still live in Russia. | Opposition network related to the “FBK” prefers to anonymise their partners in Russia. First of all, because working with the “foreign agent” is a risk of being prosecuted, secondly it could reveal supporters’ identities. “FBK” supporters are perceived by the current Russian government as a key political opponents, so they actively use law enforcement & surveillence actions against them.|
| **Artists** | [“Art doc fest”](https://artdocfest.com/en/) is an international documentary film festival help in Russia. It’s was cancelled in Moscow due to its political position & sharp visual storytelling. | Today festival is held in Riga, but many Russian documentary filmmakers prefer to stay anonymous to protect themselves, film crew & their families. Their visual stories are considered a threat by the Russian government. |
| **Famous people** | Many public figures like C-level executives of the NASDAQ-traded companies, actors, opinion leaders prefers to support NGOs, activists & opposition anonymously. | **Reason**: By using “framing” technique Russia could use their support in social media scandal creation. This could negatively affect “donor” & company public image.|
| **Foreign agent** | Every donation from abroad could be used as to frame recipient as a foreign agent. Even when the case is a donation to animal shelter or domestic violence’ victim center. | Privacy is a #1 priority within the crypto donation track. |
| **Media** | Foreign media actively work with the network of freelancers in Russia from cameramen to journalists. They cover a wide range of tasks from key events documentation to investigative journalism. | Protection is a key priority within the media operations. Because all those freelancers could be prosecuted by the law enforcement agents. |
| **Ethnical minorities** | [Crimean Tatars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Tatar_diaspora) are ethnical minority living in Crimea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. They are active supporters of Ukraine & perceive Crimea as an occupied territory. So Russian government perform surveillance & oppressive actions against them. | Privacy tools could help Crimean Tatars to maintain their ethnical culture, develop fund for a legal support, scale network of their operations & survive under a harsh conditions. |
| **Ukrainian journalists** | Freedom House. Freedom of the net report: "Following the Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage” from cities and regions under Russian siege. At least eight journalists, including online journalists, were killed by Russian forces during the coverage period... The Institute of Mass Information (IMI), by the end of May 2022, had recorded [280 crimes against journalists](https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/280-crimes-against-journalists-and-the-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-three-months-of-war-i45745) and media in Ukraine committed by Russian forces". |
