grants/w3p-01.md

  W3P: 1
  Title: Privacy services from Zcash to Status usage within the Ukrainian-Russian war (research)
  Status: grant approved by Zcash community grants
  Type: Research
  Created: 2023-02-01

Contents

• Context
• Ukrainian side
• Russian side
• Explicit cases

Context

Context: Research on how private web3-solutions are used within the Ukrainian-Russian war (with a focus on privacy-protecting currencies like Zcash). It covers both free & occupied Ukrainian territory & Russia. Where even a "like, share or tweet" is enough for prosecution. Meaning that privacy is the way for freedom of speech protection.

Important notes: Privacy of the general public is under attack OONI: "In March 2022, the State Duma and the Federation Council quickly adopted amendments to the Criminal Code. According to the amendments, spreading fake news about military actions, calling for sanctions, and discrediting the Russian armed forces faces will be followed by penalties ranging from a fine of 100,000 rubles to 15 years in prison, for example:

• A fine of 100,000 rubles will be charged “for actions aimed at discrediting the RF Armed Forces, including for public calls to obstruct the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.”
• 15 years in prison for spreading fakes about the use of the Russian armed forces, if they entailed serious consequences. In addition, articles 207.1 and 207.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are in force, according to which the dissemination of unreliable socially significant information (e.g., about the depreciation of the ruble, the collapse of the economy or default) can be also followed by charges."

Roskomnadzor indicated that to cover the Russian military actions in Ukraine only information and data from official Russian sources should be used. Roskomnadzor prohibited naming the “special operation” an attack, an invasion, or a war. Thus, any information that was not obtained from a Russian official source, such as the Ministry of Defense, should be considered fake. In addition to the obvious violation of the provisions of the Russian Constitution and of the laws “On Mass Media”, both of which prohibit censorship.

In 2022, Network Freedoms counted 779 cases of criminal charges brought for statements on the network (posts, reposts, statuses on social networks and messengers). This is the annual maximum for 15 years of observations, according to the project’s annual report on Internet freedom in Russia.

Ukrainian side

Audience	Context	Privacy role	Zcash (privacy coins)	dVPN	Browser	Messenger	Storage
Journalist	Free territories: Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. Occupied territories: on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local microcommunities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight antrocities. Moreover: it covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc.	1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).	Means for survival	1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility.	1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing.	1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage.	1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant.
Volunteer	Free territories:_ humanitarian aid_: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; military related: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. Occupied territories: humanitarian aid: wants to protect financial sources; military related: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community.	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Activist	Free territories: wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities. Occupied territories: wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community. Note: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveilance	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Politician	Free territories: need to have secure communication with partners, team & military; Occupied territories: protect communication; protect local human-network; anonimise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Military	Free territories: secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity) Occupied territories: protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions - protect personal life	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
LGBTQI+	Free territories: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm Occupied territories: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties)	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Ethnical minorities	Free territories: Occupied territories: protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars); protect their donors; protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Researchers	Free territories: look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). Occupied territories: look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information; protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Civil society orgs	Free territories: Occupied territories:	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
DAOs	Free territories: Occupied territories:	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Religious minorities	Free territories: Occupied territories:	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Families of political prisoners	Free territories: Occupied territories:	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Media	Free territories: Occupied territories:	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Donors	PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc)	Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation.	+	+	+	+	+
General public	Free territories: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks. Occupied territories: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine).	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+

Russian side

Important context: “Foreign agent” is a status that marks your relations with foreign institutions (predominantly via finance & political impact). “Foreign agents” is a way to harass both individuals & organisations.

Audience	Context	Privacy role	Zcash (privacy coins)	dVPN	Browser	Messenger	Storage
Journalist	Independent journalist performs his work to highlight.	1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).	Means for survival	1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility.	1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing.	1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage.	1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant.
Volunteer	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Activist	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Politician	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Military	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
LGBTQI+	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Ethnical minorities	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Researchers	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Civil society orgs	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
DAOs	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Religious minorities	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Families of political prisoners	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Media	Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. Proekt, Mediazona, Important stories	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Donors	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Civil society orgs	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
Teachers	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+
General public	TBD	1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network.	+	+	+	+	+

Explicit cases

Audience	Context	Details
Politicians	“FBK” is a key organisation behind opposition candidate Navalny. They key members live in European Union, but thousands of supporters still live in Russia.	Opposition network related to the “FBK” prefers to anonymise their partners in Russia. First of all, because working with the “foreign agent” is a risk of being prosecuted, secondly it could reveal supporters’ identities. “FBK” supporters are perceived by the current Russian government as a key political opponents, so they actively use law enforcement & surveillence actions against them.
Artists	“Art doc fest” is an international documentary film festival help in Russia. It’s was cancelled in Moscow due to its political position & sharp visual storytelling.	Today festival is held in Riga, but many Russian documentary filmmakers prefer to stay anonymous to protect themselves, film crew & their families. Their visual stories are considered a threat by the Russian government.
Famous people	Many public figures like C-level executives of the NASDAQ-traded companies, actors, opinion leaders prefers to support NGOs, activists & opposition anonymously.	Reason: By using “framing” technique Russia could use their support in social media scandal creation. This could negatively affect “donor” & company public image.
Foreign agent	Every donation from abroad could be used as to frame recipient as a foreign agent. Even when the case is a donation to animal shelter or domestic violence’ victim center.	Privacy is a #1 priority within the crypto donation track.
Media	Foreign media actively work with the network of freelancers in Russia from cameramen to journalists. They cover a wide range of tasks from key events documentation to investigative journalism.	Protection is a key priority within the media operations. Because all those freelancers could be prosecuted by the law enforcement agents.
Ethnical minorities	Crimean Tatars are ethnical minority living in Crimea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. They are active supporters of Ukraine & perceive Crimea as an occupied territory. So Russian government perform surveillance & oppressive actions against them.	Privacy tools could help Crimean Tatars to maintain their ethnical culture, develop fund for a legal support, scale network of their operations & survive under a harsh conditions.
Ukrainian journalists	Freedom House. Freedom of the net report: "Following the Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage” from cities and regions under Russian siege. At least eight journalists, including online journalists, were killed by Russian forces during the coverage period... The Institute of Mass Information (IMI), by the end of May 2022, had recorded 280 crimes against journalists and media in Ukraine committed by Russian forces".