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@ -41,20 +41,20 @@ _In 2022, [Network Freedoms](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RiYPt8dkQAOYW6Yz4c
| Audience | Context | Privacy role | Zcash (privacy coins) | dVPN | Browser | Messenger | Storage |
| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |------------- | ------------- | ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| Journalist | **Free territories**: Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. **Occupied territories**: on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local microcommunities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight antrocities. **Moreover**: it covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| Volunteer | **Free territories**: humanitarian aid: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. **Occupied territories**: _humanitarian aid_: wants to protect financial sources; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Activist | **Free territories**: wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities. **Occupied territories**: wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community. **Note**: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveilance | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Politician | **Free territories**: need to have secure communication with partners, team & military; **Occupied territories**: protect communication; protect local human-network; anonimise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Military | **Free territories**: secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity) **Occupied territories**: protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions - protect personal life | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| LGBTQI+ | **Free territories**: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm **Occupied territories**: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Ethnical minorities | **Free territories**: abandon from the government support & still under big social pressure (like roma people). **Occupied territories**: are actively prosecuted like Crimean Tatars & are under heavy surveillance | 1. protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars). 2. Protect their donors. 3. Protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Researchers | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| DAOs | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Families of political & military prisoners | **Occupied territories**: relatives of military representatives in Ukrainian army, volunteers or political activists are the first to be prosecuted by occupied Russian forces (emotionally & physically). Notebooks, phones & socials are regurally screened on anti-Russian propaganda (both at homes, on a streets or online) | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival. 4. Secure sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network in Ukraine & abroad. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Media | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + |
| General public | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Journalist** | **Free territories**: Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. **Occupied territories**: on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local microcommunities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight antrocities. **Moreover**: it covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| **Volunteer** | **Free territories**: humanitarian aid: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. **Occupied territories**: _humanitarian aid_: wants to protect financial sources; _military related_: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Activist** | **Free territories**: wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities. **Occupied territories**: wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community. **Note**: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveilance | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politician** | **Free territories**: need to have secure communication with partners, team & military; **Occupied territories**: protect communication; protect local human-network; anonimise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Military** | **Free territories**: secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity) **Occupied territories**: protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions - protect personal life | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **LGBTQI+** | **Free territories**: protect community from cancel culture & attacks from right-wingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm **Occupied territories**: protect personal identity - prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life - LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Ethnical minorities** | **Free territories**: abandon from the government support & still under big social pressure (like roma people). **Occupied territories**: are actively prosecuted like Crimean Tatars & are under heavy surveillance | 1. protect their culture & indentity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars). 2. Protect their donors. 3. Protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerilla" fighters on occupied territories 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Researchers** | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **DAOs** | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Religious minorities** | **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Families of political & military prisoners** | **Occupied territories**: relatives of military representatives in Ukrainian army, volunteers or political activists are the first to be prosecuted by occupied Russian forces (emotionally & physically). Notebooks, phones & socials are regurally screened on anti-Russian propaganda (both at homes, on a streets or online) | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival. 4. Secure sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network in Ukraine & abroad. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Media** | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Donors** | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + |
| **General public** | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
# Russian side
@ -66,26 +66,25 @@ Recent number of laws on “foreign agents”, “on countermeasures in response
| Audience | Context | Privacy role | Zcash (privacy coins) | dVPN | Browser | Messenger | Storage |
| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |------------- | ------------- | ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| Journalist | Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| Volunteer | Under extreme pressure from law enforcement agents & constant surveillence. | 1. Protect project teams from surveillance & data leakage. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Activist | Human-rights activists are under constant surveillance. Cases covers broad activism (not just resistance movements): domestic violence AIDS/HIV community or even psychological help. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Politician | Oppositional politicians or even leading party representators that dissagree with pro-war politics are regularly fined or monitored by FSB. Oppositional activities are highly censored in the media (excluding anonymous Telegram channels & owned media managed from abroad). | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Military | Many russian military members send privately sensitive military data to Ukrainian side. At the same time they share anti-Russian or military condition sentiment to relatives or media. | 1. Protect communication with family members & Ukrainian sources. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| LGBTQI+ | On 24th of november 2022 Russian parlament passed a law on LGBTQI+ propaganda [ban](https://meduza.io/news/2022/11/24/gosduma-prinyala-zakon-o-polnom-zaprete-propagandy-lgbt). This covers previous & new content from socials to the songs. Community centers, LGBTQI+ rights activists, Telegram groups or pages on socials (including subscribers & followers) are in danger of high fines & law enforcement surveillence. | 1. Protect community from persecution. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect emotional support network. 4. Provide ability for research beyond the firewall (for both educational & emmigration reasons). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Ethnical minorities | Live under constant surveillance & additional law enforcement pressure. Moreover, their members are among the first to participate in the war (including forcing Crimean Tatars to fight against Ukrainians). | 1. Protect community from surveillance 2. Provide means for survival & culture preservation. 3. Provide tools for access information beyond the government firewall | + | + | + | + | + |
| Researchers | Academics are under police pressure. Social media are monitored, cellural data aggregated, lectures recorded. | 1. Provide ability to glimpse over the firewall. 2. Protect communication with foreign institutions & NGOs. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| Civil society orgs | Need 100% privacy of both communication & donations. Moreover, there's a high need of team protection from administrative personel to leaders. [Protestniy MGU](https://novaya.media/articles/2022/08/29/protestnyi-mgu-stal-tiuremnym) is an explicit example of the legal prosecution against Telegram micro-media. Important note: many organisations were dependend on government donors & now they are cut from this financial source (experience extreme lack of money). | 1. Protect organizational processes & people from exposure. 2. Provide means for sustainable development. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | Are actively prosecuted for extremism. [Jehovah’s Witnesses example](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-03/russian-jehovahs-witnesses-asylum-san-diego). Protestants, catolics reguralry have police visits to their churches. | 1. Protect communication with foreign partners. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Families of political prisoners | Family ties are used be police to harass both imprisoned people & their relatives. They are under surveillance & police pressure. Families are usually excluded from government financial aids. | 1. Provide means for survival. 2. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Media | Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. [Proekt](https://www.proekt.media), [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media), [Important stories](https://istories.media/en/) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | Have huge pressure from surveillance apparatus: covering both "sender" & "receiver". "Foreign agent" label could be apply to every side. Moreover, donating to a foreign agent could lead to high fines & further administrative pressure. | 1. Protect identity. | + | - | - | + | - |
| Civil society orgs | Many human rights organizations covering issues from Stalin-time mass killings to domestic violence. Many of them are not war-related, but cover many social issues & help minorities. | 1. Protect communication within community. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Teachers | Teachers are highly censored & surveiled. They are ment to promote propaganda. Western education, especially within diversity & inclusion is highly unwelcome. Even small simpathy for Ukraine could lead to school expulsion. | 1. Get access beyond state firewall. 2. Get anonimous access to anti-censored educational materials. 3. Protect communication with foreign colleagues. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Enterpreneurs | Collaboration with "non-friendly" countries could lead to external business pressure & it's shutdown. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Freelancers | Collaboration with the clients & companies from "non-friendly" countries could lead to legislative pressure & fines. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Journalist** | Independent journalist performs his work to highlight. | 1.Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | Means for survival | 1.Censorship-resistance 2. Untracebility. | 1.Decreese tracking. 2. Safer browsing. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Decrease info leakage. | 1. Protect sensitive information. 2. Keep information censorship resistant. |
| **Volunteer** | Under extreme pressure from law enforcement agents & constant surveillence. | 1. Protect project teams from surveillance & data leakage. 2. Provide means for survival. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Activist** | Human-rights activists are under constant surveillance. Cases covers broad activism (not just resistance movements): domestic violence AIDS/HIV community or even psychological help. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Politician** | Oppositional politicians or even leading party representators that dissagree with pro-war politics are regularly fined or monitored by FSB. Oppositional activities are highly censored in the media (excluding anonymous Telegram channels & owned media managed from abroad). | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Military** | Many russian military members send privately sensitive military data to Ukrainian side. At the same time they share anti-Russian or military condition sentiment to relatives or media. | 1. Protect communication with family members & Ukrainian sources. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| **LGBTQI+** | On 24th of november 2022 Russian parlament passed a law on LGBTQI+ propaganda [ban](https://meduza.io/news/2022/11/24/gosduma-prinyala-zakon-o-polnom-zaprete-propagandy-lgbt). This covers previous & new content from socials to the songs. Community centers, LGBTQI+ rights activists, Telegram groups or pages on socials (including subscribers & followers) are in danger of high fines & law enforcement surveillence. | 1. Protect community from persecution. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect emotional support network. 4. Provide ability for research beyond the firewall (for both educational & emmigration reasons). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Ethnical minorities** | Live under constant surveillance & additional law enforcement pressure. Moreover, their members are among the first to participate in the war (including forcing Crimean Tatars to fight against Ukrainians). | 1. Protect community from surveillance 2. Provide means for survival & culture preservation. 3. Provide tools for access information beyond the government firewall | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Researchers** | Academics are under police pressure. Social media are monitored, cellural data aggregated, lectures recorded. | 1. Provide ability to glimpse over the firewall. 2. Protect communication with foreign institutions & NGOs. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | - | + | + | + | + |
| **Civil society orgs** | Need 100% privacy of both communication & donations. Moreover, there's a high need of team protection from administrative personel to leaders. [Protestniy MGU](https://novaya.media/articles/2022/08/29/protestnyi-mgu-stal-tiuremnym) is an explicit example of the legal prosecution against Telegram micro-media. Important note: many organisations were dependend on government donors & now they are cut from this financial source (experience extreme lack of money). | 1. Protect communication within community. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Religious minorities** | Are actively prosecuted for extremism. [Jehovah’s Witnesses example](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-03/russian-jehovahs-witnesses-asylum-san-diego). Protestants, catolics reguralry have police visits to their churches. | 1. Protect communication with foreign partners. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Families of political prisoners** | Family ties are used be police to harass both imprisoned people & their relatives. They are under surveillance & police pressure. Families are usually excluded from government financial aids. | 1. Provide means for survival. 2. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Media** | Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. [Proekt](https://www.proekt.media), [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media), [Important stories](https://istories.media/en/) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Donors** | Have huge pressure from surveillance apparatus: covering both "sender" & "receiver". "Foreign agent" label could be apply to every side. Moreover, donating to a foreign agent could lead to high fines & further administrative pressure. | 1. Protect identity. | + | - | - | + | - |
| **Teachers** | Teachers are highly censored & surveiled. They are ment to promote propaganda. Western education, especially within diversity & inclusion is highly unwelcome. Even small simpathy for Ukraine could lead to school expulsion. | 1. Get access beyond state firewall. 2. Get anonimous access to anti-censored educational materials. 3. Protect communication with foreign colleagues. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Enterpreneurs** | Collaboration with "non-friendly" countries could lead to external business pressure & it's shutdown. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **Freelancers** | Collaboration with the clients & companies from "non-friendly" countries could lead to legislative pressure & fines. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Lawyers | Human rights legal defenders experience high pressure from personal communication surveillence to law enforcement offline monitoring | 1. Protect personal communication. 2. Protect sensitive data (documents). 3. Protect partners, foreign institutions. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Bloggers | Opposition or bloggers with big audience are constantly surveiled. Some of them pass through police brutality & were [forced to leave country](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzVyE3UP51I). Lots of them have friends in Ukraine & continue to talk with them via Telegram. Moreover, bloggers receive money from Google, Meta etc that have "foreign agent" status. | 1. Protect their life. 2. Protect personal communication. | + | + | + | + | + |
| General public | Reposts, likes, comments are enough for prosecution. Illiterate internet users are making mistakes by exposing themseles to surveillence apparatus. Smartphones are regularly checked on a streets by law enforcement agents: they screen your contacts, browsing history, messengers & gallery. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| **General public** | Reposts, likes, comments are enough for prosecution. Illiterate internet users are making mistakes by exposing themseles to surveillence apparatus. Smartphones are regularly checked on a streets by law enforcement agents: they screen your contacts, browsing history, messengers & gallery. | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
![alt text](https://github.com/web3privacy/Grants/blob/main/staticobjects/Punishment%20precedents.png?raw=true)