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Update w3p-01.md

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Mykola Siusko 2023-03-22 16:26:20 +01:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ _In 2022, [Network Freedoms](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RiYPt8dkQAOYW6Yz4c
| Researchers | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | | Researchers | **Free territories**: perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for pro-military analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations. **Occupied territories**: they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" | 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT). 2. Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information. 3. Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs - uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| DAOs | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + | | DAOs | **Occupied territories**: DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillence or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities. | 1. Protect DAO members. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). | + | + | + | + | + |
| Religious minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | | Religious minorities | **Free territories**: **Occupied territories**: are highly prosecuted for their non-ortodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity ([research, UKR](https://irf.in.ua/files/publications/2022.09-IRF-Ukraine-report-UKR.pdf)) | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Families of political & military prisoners | **Occupied territories**: relatives of those families fight in Ukrainian army, volunteer or do political work | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 4. Protect sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | | Families of political & military prisoners | **Occupied territories**: relatives of military representatives in Ukrainian army, volunteers or political activists are the first to be prosecuted by occupied Russian forces (emotionally & physically). Notebooks, phones & socials are regurally screened on anti-Russian propaganda (both at homes, on a streets or online) | 1. Protect indentity (family ties). 2. Protect communication between family members. 3. Provide means for survival. 4. Secure sensitive data (documents). 5. Protect support network in Ukraine & abroad. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Media | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + | | Media | **Free territories**: they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media) **Occupied territories**: there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position | 1. Protect founders & team from de-anonimizing (including powerful surveillence tools). 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network from partners to followers. | + | + | + | + | + |
| Donors | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + | | Donors | PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc) | Protects from public scandal. Protects from info manipulation. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side | + | + | + | + | + |
| General public | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | | General public | **Free territories**: Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). **Occupied territories**: every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + |