Privacy use-cases with Zcash (privacy coin) focus within the Ukrainian-Russian war

Control over internet

https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/privacy-services-from-zcash-to-status-usage-within-the-ukrainian-russian-war-research/43940

POLITICAL

Freedom of speech

(share info with Wikileaks, NYT)

Life-saving

(save life in Iran or Syria)

Censorship resistant

(check websites beyond Chinese Great Firewall)

ECONOMICAL

Financial

(sensitive financial data, avoid taxations)

Anti-fraud

(protect from hackers or Phishing)

Anti-marketing surveillance

(decrease accuracy of ads model, Cambridge Analytica disrupting elections)

ETHICAL

Sensitive exposure

(adults website, anonymous alcoholics, religious groups, sexual orientation)

Professional efficiency

(tech proven authenticity of your certification or prof background)

General ethics

(privacy-as-a-human right)

War as a privacy catalyst



ECONOMICAL

Financial

(sensitive financial data, avoid taxations)

Control over internet

Freedom of speech

Internet surveillance

Internet censorship

Active propaganda

Privacy necessity in Ukraine



When Russia conquers the Ukrainian region, they

- Reroute internet traffic
- O Seize communication equipment
- O Read your messages (street police check phones)
- O Censor pro-Ukrainian websites
- O Surveil your traffic
- O Force to use Russian SIM cards

How could Web3 enhance Ukrainian citizens' privacy, security & life?



Surveil internet

Pass anti-democratic laws Internet censorship in action

Law enforcement agents invading your house

Fines, imprisonment, physical violence

Russian threat model **—**




Punishment

Journalist	Volunteer	Activist	Artist	
Ethnic minorities	Researchers	Teachers	Civil society orgs	
Financial donors	Media	Families with cross-border ties	Publishers	
Politician	Opposition supporters	LGBTQI+	General public	
Religious minorities	Families of political prisoners	Writers	Domestic violence survivors	

0 N

Fine Imprisonment Bureaucratic Fiscal pressure pressure Online hate Online stalking speech Financial sources Media exclusion drainage Death (forced war participation)

Punishment precedents



Punishment

Fine

Imprisonment

Fiscal pressure

Bureaucratic pressure

Online stalking

Online hate speech

Financial sources drainage

Media exclusion

Death (forced war participation)

Privacy use cases



Journalists	Volunteers	Activists	Artists	Politicians	Military	LGBTQI+
Ethnic minorities	Researchers	Teachers	Civil society orgs	Religious minorities	Families of political prisoners	Writers
Financial donors	Media	Families with cross-border ties	Publishers	Opposition supporters	Domestic violence survivors	Human rights lawyers
Eco-activists	Feminists	Counter-culture members	Bloggers	Media contractors (photographers, video makers)	Freelancers	Entrepreneurs
Families of activists, minorities	Teens	Working class	General public			

me63 Privacy coins' value proposition (2) privach 100 100 Sustain civil society **Protects from Prevent** Strengthen family orgs collaboration harm ties Support democracy Decrease domestic **Protect minorities** Sustain critical violence academic Recording the researches Provide means for truth survival (iournalism) **Empower volunteer** Protect forests via Save lives movement eco-activism Support art Make people happier Free people from Maintain talent being hostages development Help to escape Protect from hostile stress environment **Protect from Protect from** stress physical violence **Empower** Maintain alternative **Protect from Protect religious** women education physical believers from sin violence Sustain political

movements

Ukraine use-cases

Privacy case: Ukrainian teenagers deported to Russian territories





Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters" and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their: towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Occupied territories


Teens are exposed to spontaneous leakage of anti-government position (from gamers playing Counter-Strike and using an in-game chat to casual conversations with peers).

Case: Kherson teens returned to Ukraine

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN

Communication: messenger



of the war.

Privacy benefits

Anti-censorship Access blocked websites to get a pro-Ukrainian picture

Receive financial help beyond state control

Hide source of income

Anonymise that you receive money from Ukraine

Connect with your family & friends without traceability

Connect with organisations helping to return you back Protect communication with both Ukrainian & Russian NGOs or state agents

Privacy case: Journalist



Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

Independent journalist performs his work to highlight war crimes & need protection of both communication, document circulation from leakage.

Occupied territories


on occupied territories: social journalists behind Telegram or local micro-communities (including Donetsk or Luhansk) continue to highlight atrocities.

It covers all the freelancers: video editors, cameraman, copywriters, analytics etc.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

humanitarian aid: wants to increase donations from abroad; protect sources, so they wont be labeled as a "foreign agent"; military related: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community


Occupied territories

humanitarian aid: wants to protect financial sources; military related: needs to protect sensitive information, communication & community.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- Protect support network.



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

wants to have means for survival & sustainable activities.


Occupied territories

wants to have means for survival; protect financial sources, aid network & communication; protect community.

Note: being a man (military age) is enough reason for surveillance

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN



- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.

Privacy case: Politician





Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

need to have secure communication with partners, team & military

Occupied territories

protect communication; protect local human-network; anonymise sources of income - they could unveil pro-Ukrainian position & lead to imprisonment

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- Protect support network.



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

secure communication; receive donations from all sources (but protect their identity)

Occupied territories

protect identity; secure communication; hide source of transactions – protect personal life

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

- Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- Protect support network.



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

protect community from cancel culture & attacks from rightwingers; protect donors from PR or law enforcement harm

Occupied territories

protect personal identity – prevent physical & emotional harm; protect life – LGBTQI+ groups are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies (could lead to physical harm, imprisonment, financial penalties)

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN

Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.

Privacy case: Ethnical minorities





Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

abandon from the government support & still under big social pressure (like Roma people).

Occupied territories

are actively prosecuted like Crimean Tatars & are under heavy surveillance

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. protect their culture & identity as law enforcement units harass their people (search Crimean Tatars).
- 2. Protect their donors.
- 3. Protect communication with Ukrainian side & "guerrilla" fighters on occupied territories
- 4. Protect support network.



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

perform their research-based activities, but lots of sources are censored by Ukrainian government. Some of these researches are academics, others could work for promilitary analytical center, NGO. social barometer organisations.

Occupied territories

they can't escape to foreign universities with ease (from the western bureaucracy to lack of funding), but they have a need to establish connections with institutions that will be marked as "foreign agents" (or NGOs like Scholars at Risk organisation)

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN

Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. Look beyond the local "firewall" & analyse pro-Russian sources (including OCINT).
- Look beyond Russian firewall to receive not-censored information.
- Protect communication with foreign & Ukrainian universities & NGOs uncovering could lead to penalties & imprisonment
- 4. Protect sensitive data (documents).
 - 5. Protect support network.



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional:** street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Occupied territories

DAO members could work & support activities being under surveillance or extensive internet traffic analysis. One member surveillance could lead to whole DAO monitoring & counter-activities.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. Protect DAO members.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).

Privacy case: Religious minorities





Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.


Occupied territories

are highly prosecuted for their non-orthodox views, so they need communication protection, hide their donors identity (research, UKR)

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger



1. Protect communication.

- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.

Privacy case: Families of political & military prisoners





Background

More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Occupied territories


relatives of military representatives in Ukrainian army, volunteers or political activists are the first to be prosecuted by occupied Russian forces (emotionally & physically). Notebooks, phones & socials are regularly screened on anti-Russian propaganda (both at homes, on a streets or online)

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- Protect identity (family ties).
- 2. Protect communication between family members.
- Provide means for survival.
- 4. Secure sensitive data (documents).
- 5. Protect support network in Ukraine & abroad



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

they need to source information beyond existing firewall; receive donations from abroad (especially, in the case of micro-media or specific like pro-feminist media)

Occupied territories

there are lots of micro-media like Telegram chats that have pro-Ukrainian position

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. Protect founders & team from deanonymizing (including powerful surveillance tools).
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network from partners to followers.



PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc)

Threat actors


Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger



- 1. Protects from public scandal.
- 2. Protects from info manipulation.
- 3. Protect from "foreign agent" status from the Russian side

Privacy case: Working class



Background

PR-sensitive personas (public, NASDAQ-traded companies, government actors etc)

Threat actors

Main: Russian government **Additional**: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.


Occupied territories

Russia occupied around 1150 Ukrainian companies, substituted leadership, partly reorganised production into pro-military work. Meaning, that thousands of Ukrainians still work at these factories, telco companies, construction industry etc under huge surveillance and ban on freedom of speech. They continue work to survive financially.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

- 1. Protects communication with relatives in Ukraine.
- 2. Get means for survival.
- 3. Protect from pro-Russian collaboration (financial independence).



More than 16 thousand kids were deported from Ukraine to Russia by force. They live in temporary "shelters", and orphanages under constant surveillance & lying about their towns & war conditions. Smartphones have pre-installed propaganda apps.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Free territories

Ukrainians are highly exposed to scams, malware attacks, so they need to protect their personal data (from financial to passwords & accounts). security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations.

Occupied territories

every "like" could lead to a criminal investigation & imprisonment (like = support of Ukraine), so they need to increase their internet security literacy level & protect their identities & communication; if they have important relatives on Ukrainian side (activists, military, politicians etc) - hide their relations.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

Privacy benefits

Anti-censorship
Access blocked websites to get a pro-Ukrainian picture of the war

Receive financial help beyond state control

Hide source of income Anonymise that you receive money from Ukraine

,

Connect with your family & friends without traceability

Connect with organisations helping to return you back Protect communication with both Ukrainian & Russian NGOs or state agents

Russia use-cases

Privacy case: Journalist





Background

Independent journalist performs his work to highlight war crimes & share insights beyond the government "firewall".

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Hide source of income

Anonymise that you receive money from Ukraine

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

Privacy benefits

Anti-censorship

Access blocked websites to get a pro-Ukrainian picture of the war.

or the war.

Receive financial help beyond state control

1.Protect communicat Provide mea

survival. 3. F sensitive dat (documents)



Under extreme pressure from law enforcement agents & constant surveillance.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

- 1. Protect project teams from surveillance & data leakage.
- 2. Provide means for survival.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Human-rights activists are under constant surveillance. Cases covers broad activism (not just resistance movements): domestic violence AIDS/HIV community or even psychological help.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN



Browsing : Web3--native browser

Communication: messenger

- Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Oppositional politicians or even leading party representations that disagree with pro-war politics are regularly fined or monitored by FSB. Oppositional activities are highly censored in the media (excluding anonymous Telegram channels & owned media managed from abroad).

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) **Internel access**: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Many Russian military members send privately sensitive military data to Ukrainian side. At the same time they share anti-Russian or military condition sentiment to relatives or media.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Protect communication with family members & Ukrainian sources.
- 2. Protect sensitive data (documents).



On 24th of November 2022 Russian parliament passed a law on LGBTQI+ propaganda ban. This covers previous & new content from socials to the songs. Community centres, LGBTQI+ rights activists, Telegram groups or pages on socials (including subscribers & followers) are in danger of high fines & law enforcement surveillance.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) **Internel access**: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

- 1. Protect community from persecution.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect emotional support network.
- 4. Provide ability for research beyond the firewall (for both educational & immigration reasons).



Live under constant surveillance & additional law enforcement pressure. Moreover, their members are among the first to participate in the war (including forcing Crimean Tatars to fight against Ukrainians).

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities


Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



Communication: messenger

- 1. Protect community from surveillance
- 2. Provide means for survival & culture preservation.
- 3. Provide tools for access information beyond the government firewall



Academics are under police pressure. Social media are monitored, cellular data aggregated, lectures recorded.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

- 1. Provide ability to glimpse over the firewall.
- 2. Protect communication with foreign institutions & NGOs.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).

Privacy case: Civil society orgs





Background

Need 100% privacy of both communication & donations. Moreover, there's a high need of team protection from administrative personnel to leaders. Protestniy MGU is an explicit example of the legal prosecution against Telegram micro-media. Important note: many organisations were dependent on government donors & now they are cut from this financial source (experience extreme lack of money).

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

- 1. Protect communication within community.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Are actively prosecuted for extremism. Jehovah's Witnesses example. Protestants, Catholics regularly have police visits to their churches.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Protect communication with foreign partners.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect support network.

Privacy case: Families of political prisoners





Background

Family ties are used be police to harass both imprisoned people & their relatives. They are under surveillance & police pressure. Families are usually excluded from government financial aids.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) **Internel access**: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

- 1. Provide means for survival.
- 2. Protect sensitive data (documents).



Media are actively censored, framed as a "foreign agents", because of their influence role within society. Proekt, Mediazona, Important stories

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)

- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Have huge pressure from surveillance apparatus: covering both "sender" & "receiver". "Foreign agent" label could be apply to every side. Moreover, donating to a foreign agent could lead to high fines & further administrative pressure.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

Privacy benefits

Protect identity.



Teachers are highly censored & surveilled. They are meant to promote propaganda. Western education, especially within diversity & inclusion is highly unwelcome. Even small sympathy for Ukraine could lead to school expulsion.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Get access beyond state firewall.
- 2. Get anonymous access to anti-censored educational materials.
- 3. Protect communication with foreign colleagues.

Privacy case: Entrepreneurs





Background

Collaboration with "non-friendly" countries could lead to external business pressure & it's shutdown.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Protect communication.
- 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Collaboration with the clients & companies from "non-friendly" countries could lead to legislative pressure & fines.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
Communication: messenger

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)



- 1. Protect communication.
- Provide means for survival & sustainable activities.
- 3. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 4. Protect support network.



Human rights legal defenders experience high pressure from personal communication surveillance to law enforcement offline monitoring. Interregional Association of Human Rights Organizations "Agora" was one of the first to be named a "foreign agent".

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
Internel access: dVPN



Browsing: Web3-native browser **Communication**: messenger

- 1. Protect personal communication.
- 2. Protect sensitive data (documents).
- 3. Protect partners, foreign institutions.



Opposition or bloggers with big audience are constantly surveilled. Some of them pass through police brutality & were forced to leave country. Lots of them have friends in Ukraine & continue to talk with them via Telegram. Moreover, bloggers receive money from Google, Meta etc that have "foreign agent" status.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs, Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Internel access: dVPN
Browsing: Web3-native browser
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- 1. Protect their life.
- 2. Protect personal communication.



Reposts, likes, comments are enough for prosecution. Even small jokes. Illiterate internet users are making mistakes by exposing themselves to surveillance apparatus. Smartphones are regularly checked on a streets by law enforcement agents: they screen your contacts, browsing history, messengers & gallery.

Threat actors

Main: Russian government

Additional: street police officers, digital analysts, ISPs,

Mobile network operators

Risk level: high

Risk factor: physical & emotional threats.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash)
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Browsing: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger

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Explicit Cases



"FBK" is a key organisation behind opposition candidate Navalny. They key members live in European Union, but thousands of supporters still live in Russia.

Details

Opposition network related to the "FBK" prefers to anonymise their partners in Russia. First of all, because working with the "foreign agent" is a risk of being prosecuted, secondly it could reveal supporters' identities. "FBK" supporters are perceived by the current Russian government as a key political opponents, so they actively use law enforcement & surveillance actions against them.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



"Art doc fest" is an international documentary film festival help in Russia. It's was cancelled in Moscow due to its political position & sharp visual storytelling.

Angie Vinchito

Anonymous documentary filmmaker.

Details

Today festival is held in Riga, but many Russian documentary filmmakers prefer to stay anonymous to protect themselves, film crew & their families. Their visual stories are considered a threat by the Russian government.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



Many public figures like C-level executives of the NASDAQ-traded companies, actors, opinion leaders prefers to support NGOs, activists & opposition anonymously.

Details

Reason: By using "framing" technique Russia could use their support in social media scandal creation. This could negatively affect "donor" & company public image.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN





Every donation from abroad could be used as to frame recipient as a foreign agent. Even when the case is a donation to animal shelter or domestic violence' victim center. Moreover, "foreign agent" status leads to prosecution of the Nobel Prize 2022 co-recepients Memorial

Details

Privacy is a #1 priority within the crypto donation track that helps wider audiences to survive financially, protect senders from persecution & build network of support.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



Foreign media actively work with the network of freelancers in Russia from cameramen to journalists. They cover a wide range of tasks from key events documentation to investigative journalism.

Details

Protection is a key priority within the media operations. Because all those freelancers could be prosecuted by the law enforcement agents.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN





Crimean Tatars are ethnical minority living in Crimea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014. They are active supporters of Ukraine & perceive Crimea as an occupied territory. So Russian government perform surveillance & oppressive actions against them.

Details

Privacy tools could help Crimean Tatars to maintain their ethnical culture, develop fund for a legal support, scale network of their operations & survive under a harsh conditions.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN **Browsing**: Web3-native browser

Communication: messenger



Freedom House, Freedom of the net report: "Following the Russian invasion, journalists in Ukraine have faced extreme danger due to Russian attacks while conducting their work. According to rights experts at the United Nations, journalists have been "targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked, and killed, or refused safe passage" from cities and regions under Russian siege. At least eight journalists, including online journalists, were killed by Russian forces during the coverage period...

Details

Privacy tools could help journalists cover human rights violation & sustain their lives under constant surveillance. The Institute of Mass Information (IMI), by the end of May 2022, had recorded 280 crimes against journalists and media in Ukraine committed by Russian forces".

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



Priest Serhiv Chudinovich: "On March 30, 2022. I was captured by representatives of the Russian Federation in Kherson. I spent the whole day in their premises. I was accused of participating in the activities of sabotage and intelligence groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, of being a member of the territorial defence". Or Oleg Bondarenko's, a church servant of the "Vosor" Adaptation Center at the "Salvation" Pentecostal Church, story.

Details

Privacy tools could help religious groups to defend their imprisoned members &/or create a support network.

Full report

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



Schools, universities are under a constant political pressure & freedom of speech oppression. There are numerous cases of kids contacting law enforcement for teacher' anti-Russian or pro-Ukrainian monologues (max charge: 15 years in prison).

Details

Tamara Edelman was named a foreign agent & was forced to move out of Russia. BBC coverage

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN





Relatives of everyone from LGBTQI+ people to journalists that fled the country are used to put external pressure on surveilled person. Chechnia is famous for using family-ties to force LGBTQI+ people return back & being imprisoned or "convert" into traditional values.

Details

Privacy tools could help LGBTQI+ community create & maintain effective support network from emotional support to financial help with immigration.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2) Internel access: dVPN





Organised activism is banned in Russia. Feminist Anti-War Resistance organisation aims to protest against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. They are champions of counterpropaganda, volunteering & organising. At the same time they are labeled as a "foreign agent" & actively surveilled.

Details

Privacy tools could help feminists to self-organise & decrease sensitive data leakage. At the same time crypto donations could empower organisational efficiency

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN



Ekaterina Schulmann is an example of academic & active influencer who was labeled a foreign agent & was forced to leave Russia.

Details

Privacy tools could help academics to protect their communication with foreign institutions, organizations that help flee the country. Moreover, they could protect sensitive documents from leakage.

Opportunities

Donations: private currencies (Zcash) (2)



Internel access: dVPN

Summary

- 1. The necessity for privacy is applicable to the widest audience you could imagine.
- 2. Like or re-tweet could lead to fine & freedom limitation.
- 3. Range of privacy tools from Zcash to Status could empower hundreds of use-cases within the crisis.

Empower People with more use-cases!



