From 77d971b470c983583675ff81cf987079f51a0292 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mykola Siusko <116563801+Msiusko@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2023 11:43:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Update w3p-01.md --- w3p-01.md | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/w3p-01.md b/w3p-01.md index 7f76665..0db99cb 100644 --- a/w3p-01.md +++ b/w3p-01.md @@ -5,9 +5,29 @@ Type: Research Created: 2023-02-01 +## Contents +- [Context](#Context) +- [Ukrainian side](#Ukrainian-side) +- [Russian side](#Russian-side) +- [Explicit cases](#Explicit-cases) + +# Context **Context**: Research on how private web3-solutions are used within the Ukrainian-Russian war (with a focus on privacy-protecting currencies like Zcash). +**Important notes**: +**Privacy of the general public is under attack** +[OONI](https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/): "In March 2022, the State Duma and the Federation Council quickly adopted amendments to the Criminal Code. According to the amendments, spreading fake news about military actions, calling for sanctions, and discrediting the Russian armed forces faces will be followed by penalties ranging from a fine of 100,000 rubles to 15 years in prison, for example: + +- A fine of 100,000 rubles will be charged “for actions aimed at discrediting the RF Armed Forces, including for public calls to obstruct the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.” +- 15 years in prison for spreading fakes about the use of the Russian armed forces, if they entailed serious consequences. +In addition, articles 207.1 and 207.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are in force, according to which the dissemination of unreliable socially significant information (e.g., about the depreciation of the ruble, the collapse of the economy or default) can be also followed by charges." + +_Roskomnadzor indicated that to cover the Russian military actions in Ukraine only information and data from official Russian sources should be used. Roskomnadzor prohibited naming the “special operation” an attack, an invasion, or a war. Thus, any information that was not obtained from a Russian official source, such as the Ministry of Defense, should be considered fake. In addition to the obvious violation of the provisions of the Russian Constitution and of the laws “On Mass Media”, both of which prohibit censorship._ + +_In 2022, Network Freedoms counted 779 cases of criminal charges brought for statements on the network (posts, reposts, statuses on social networks and messengers). This is the annual maximum for 15 years of observations, according to the project’s annual report on Internet freedom in Russia._ + + # Ukrainian side | Audience | Context | Privacy role | Zcash (privacy coins) | dVPN | Browser | Messenger | Storage | @@ -52,7 +72,7 @@ | Teachers | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | | General public | TBD | 1. Protect communication. 2. Provide means for survival & sustainable activities. 3. Protect sensitive data (documents). 4. Protect support network. | + | + | + | + | + | -## Explicit examples +# Explicit cases | Audience | Context | Details | | ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |